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ABSTRACT 
 We explore the impact of regulatory supply constraints on house price levels following 
boom and bust periods in London. We hypothesize that when regulatory restrictiveness increases 
during a boom period, house prices will be higher in the following year compared to house prices 
in less restricted areas. We also hypothesize that when regulatory restrictiveness increases during 
a bust period, house prices will be lower in the following year compared to house prices in less 
restricted areas. We empirically test our hypothesis using a multilevel mixed-effects model with a 
panel data set of 32 boroughs of London, ranging from 2001 to 2013. Our analysis reveals that our 
hypothesis holds true. A borough with a strict planning authority will have higher house prices 
following a boom period and lower house prices following a bust period compared to prices in a 
borough with a more lenient planning authority. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
London is a vibrant, dynamic, and diverse city with a rich history. Dating back to 43 A.D., 
London has been able to successfully evolve and sustain itself as a global hub. Though London’s 
urbanization has led to prosperity, challenges inevitably follow. Currently, high and rising house 
prices pose as a challenge to London and its people. 
 Space is at a premium in the UK’s capital. Figure 1 shows that London’s residential real 
estate is the third most expensive in the world. One million US dollars will buy 21 square meters 
of luxury property in London. This is the result of not building enough housing to accommodate 
London’s growing population. Due to population growth and social changes that have reduced 
household size, the number of households in London has grown by an estimated 540,000 over the 
last 20 years (Mayor of London). Housing supply, however, has not been able to grow 
proportionally. The Office of the Mayor of London estimates that supply has only grown by 
430,000 over the same time period (Mayor of London). This gap between housing supply and 
demand has driven prices up, consequently reducing affordable housing options. In addition, 
median wages in London have not been able to keep up with the increasing housing prices. This 
can be seen in Figure 2.  
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Figure 1: Price Comparison for Major Cities 
 
Source: First Post-Wealth Report 
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Figure 2: Percentage Changes in Median House Prices and 
 Median Weekly Wage in London 
 
 
 Rising real estate prices have multiple implications for housing demand. Those who desire 
to purchase a home are now less financially able to do so and therefore seek alternative living 
accommodations. This places further upward pressure on rent prices. Figure 3 illustrates London’s 
rising rent prices over the past 17 years for London’s three most expensive boroughs, Camden, 
City of Westminster, and Kensington and Chelsea, and London’s three least expensive boroughs, 
Barking and Dagenham, Newham, and Waltham and Forest.  
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Figure 3: London Rent Trends 
 
  
High house prices place an upward pressure on rental prices, increasing the price of housing 
for all, both those who purchase a home and those who rent. London’s housing affordability, or 
lack thereof, limits London from reaching its full potential. Edward Glaeser, a well-respected 
urban economist, states in Triumph of the City, “Cities enable the collaboration that makes 
humanity shine most brightly. Because humans learn so much from other humans, we learn more 
when there are more people around us. Urban density creates a constant flow of new information 
that comes from observing others’ successes and failures” (245). By encouraging these network 
effects, a city can in turn benefit by attracting intelligent and creative people who add value. 
However, unfavorable characteristics, such as exorbitant housing prices, may encourage the people 
a city could benefit from attracting to look elsewhere. Consequently, high and rising house prices 
pose a threat to London’s future economic growth. For these and many other reasons, further 
examination of London’s housing prices is worthy of exploration.  
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
As discussed above, affordable housing prices are critical to the success of a city. However, 
real estate prices in England, particularly in London and surrounding areas, are considered to be 
among the highest in the world. In order to develop an effective solution to curtail housing prices 
and volatility in London, it is imperative to understand the causal drivers. Many economists have 
already started to lay the groundwork. 
 Many people believe the housing prices in London are being pushed up by an increase in 
demand, due to rising incomes, and constrained supply of residential real estate. As people become 
richer, they often demand larger houses and more outdoor space; however, housing supply is not 
able to keep up. Cheshire et al. state in Urban Economics and Urban Policy, “The high price of 
housing is essentially driven by policy not by natural constraints” (80). Cheshire et al, in addition 
to many other economists, claim land use regulations impact the level and volatility of house 
prices. The UK planning system, initiated by the Town and Country Planning Act, has the 
reputation of being inflexible. Hilber and Vermeulen argue, “Historically, it ignored market signals 
and has failed adequately to cope with changing socio-economic conditions” (1). Since the 
development of containment policies in 1947, British policy has constrained the housing supply to 
grow more slowly than demand.1   
 Hilber and Vermeulen develop an empirical model that examines the impact of both 
regulatory and geographic supply constraints on house price levels in England. Their data set spans 
35 years from 1974 to 2008 and includes 353 Local Planning Authorities in England. These 
locations have, they state, “rich and direct information on regulatory and physical supply 
                                                          
1 “The act set out to contain urban areas and stop them spilling out into surrounding countryside and preserve amenities of various 
kinds including separating land uses which might be incompatible (for example industry from residential)” (Cheshire et al., 81).  
8 
 
constraints” (3). Their empirical results show that both regulatory and geographic supply 
constraints have a strong, positive relationship with real estate prices in the long run. 
 In addition to housing prices, many economists have investigated house price volatility and 
how it relates to the elasticity of supply. Cheshire et al. argue that, “Since policy intentionally and 
very firmly restricts the land for housing or any other urban development it is no surprise that the 
supply of housing has become progressively more inelastic” (83). From the fundamental theory of 
supply and demand, demand shocks will cause larger price fluctuations in a market with more 
inelastic supply than in a market with elastic supply.   
 The English housing market, like all other housing markets, has boom-bust cycles. These 
cycles, which entail large swings in asset prices, are considered to be a concern for macroeconomic 
stability. Huang and Tang claim, “Historical experiences in the US and other industrialized 
countries show that asset price cycles often coincided with, or preceded, booms and busts of 
business cycles” (1). It is apparent these cycles are significant and require exploration.  
 In 2008, Glaeser et al. develop “a simple model of housing bubbles which predicts that 
places with more elastic housing supply have fewer and shorter bubbles, with smaller price 
increases” (1). Using this model and data from 79 metropolitan areas in the US between 1982 and 
2006, they find that in places with inelastic supply the average boom lasted for more than four 
years compared to the average of 1.7 years in elastic areas. In addition, they find that in the housing 
boom of 1984-1989, real estate prices in real terms increased an average of 23.2 percent in less 
elastic markets and by a mere five percent in more elastic housing markets. However, their results 
regarding bust periods are inconclusive. Glaeser et al. states, “While the level of mean reversion 
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during the bust is enormous, there is little correlation between price declines during the bust and 
the degree of elasticity” (37). 
 To supplement Glaeser et al.’s empirical analysis, Huang and Tang develop a model to 
better define the ambiguous relationship between housing prices and supply constraints during 
busts. They state, “Because the fall in house prices is the key to the destabilizing impact of a 
housing price cycle, it is important to understand what contributes to the magnitude of price 
corrections” (3). In contrast to Glaeser et al.’s model which only considered government regulation 
or “man-made scarcity” as a supply constraint, Huang and Tang’s model includes both residential 
land use regulation and geographic land scarcity as supply constraints. Using a sample consisting 
of 326 US cities between 2000 and 2009, Huang and Tang’s empirical results indicate that the 
regulatory and geographic supply constraints substantially added to the magnitude of the housing 
price boom as well as the housing price bust. In addition, their results suggest that both types of 
supply constraints intensified the responsiveness of real estate prices to an initial demand shock 
generated from the mortgage market, leading to larger price increases during the boom period and 
larger price decreases during the subsequent bust.   
 Given what Hilber and Vermeulen’s model reveals for England and Huang and Tang’s 
model reveals for the US, we identify a gap in the research for London’s housing market 
specifically. It is common knowledge London’s house prices have been on a drastic upswing. From 
our prior knowledge described above, planning induced supply constraints are contributing factors 
to these high and rising housing prices. However, from both Glaeser et al. and Huang and Tang’s 
research, we know a change in a supply constraint affects housing prices differently during boom 
periods and bust periods. This leads us to our research question motivating this paper: How do 
planning induced supply constraints affect price levels following boom periods and bust periods 
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in London? Through the examination of changes in price levels during boom and bust periods, we 
can better understand and quantify the impact of planning induced supply constraints in London.  
3 METHODOLOGY & DATA 
3.1 Analytical Framework and Empirical Specification  
 Simple supply and demand diagrams can be used to illustrate how we approach answering 
our question at hand. Consider two boroughs that are identical in all respects except for the 
restrictiveness of their planning authorities, as measured by the fraction of applications received 
for new residential developments that are approved by each authority. In Figure 4, Borough 1 
represents a borough with a strict planning authority, meaning the acceptance rate of planning 
applications submitted is low relative to a more lenient planning authority. Therefore, this 
translates into an inelastic supply of housing in Borough 1 due to constrained housing 
development. On the contrary, Borough 2 represents a borough with a lenient planning authority. 
Housing development is not constrained in Borough 2 and, therefore, the supply of housing is 
relatively more elastic when compared to Borough 1.  
Figure 4: Supply and Demand of Housing Market 
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Given an equivalent outward shift of the demand curve for housing in each borough, 
economic theory tells us prices will be higher in a market with inelastic supply compared to a 
market with elastic supply. This can be seen in Figure 5. The price increase in Borough 1, from 𝑃0 
to 𝑃1, is much larger compared to the price increase in Borough 2, from 𝑃0 to 𝑃2.  
Figure 5: Effect of Outward Shift of Demand Curve on Housing Prices 
 
Similarly, given an equivalent inward shift of the demand curve for housing in each 
borough, economic theory also tells us prices will be lower in a market with inelastic supply 
compared to a market with elastic supply. This can be seen in Figure 6. The fall in price between 
𝑃0 and 𝑃1 is much larger than the fall in price between 𝑃0 and 𝑃2. 
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Figure 6: Effect of Inward Shift of Demand Curve on Housing Prices 
 
The economic theory laid out in the preceding examples underlies our empirical strategy. 
Our goal is to identify the effect of supply constraints on price, as measured by planning authority 
restrictiveness. Our data, as discussed in detail in the next section, are compatible with a “fixed 
effects” approach. However, we will estimate a multilevel mixed-effects model.2 “Fixed effects 
models,” as commonly employed in economics, assume that each cross-sectional unit has an effect 
that is fixed over time without making specific assumptions about the distribution of these “fixed 
effects” across groups.3 In a mixed-effects model, the effect of each cross-sectional unit is assumed 
to be a random number drawn from a normal distribution.  
At first glance, the fact that specific distributional assumptions about the cross-sectional-
unit-specific intercepts are not made as part of “fixed effects” estimation but are made as part of 
mixed-effects estimation appears to be a positive feature of the “fixed effects model.” However, 
                                                          
2 Multilevel mixed-effects models are also called hierarchical models. 
3 Note that this does not imply that these “fixed effects,” or cross-sectional-unit-specific intercepts, are not random draws from a 
population characterizable by some specific distribution. It merely implies that these cross-sectional-unit-specific intercepts are not 
constrained to follow a specific distribution as part of the estimation procedure, whether they are estimated directly in a dummy 
variable regression fixed effects implementation or calculated post estimation using the estimates obtained from a within 
transformation fixed effects implementation. For additional details, see Wooldridge (2002, pages 251-252). 
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this generality allows the estimated effect of each borough to be anything, without regard to any 
distributional relationship among boroughs.4 In a mixed-effects model, the effect of each borough 
is assumed to be drawn from a normal distribution that is centered around a common mean with 
some variance. The mean and variance that are the most likely to characterize the data generating 
process that gave rise to the boroughs as observed in the data are estimated as part of the (restricted) 
maximum likelihood estimation procedure. In this way, the effect of each borough is constrained 
by each individual borough effect needing to fall within this common normal distribution. This 
allows the model to better deal with unobserved heterogeneity and has benefits when a cross-
sectional unit is missing observations over time.  
In order to quantify the relationship between planning induced supply constraints and price 
levels following boom periods and bust periods, we estimate a multilevel mixed-effects model.  
Mixed-effects models are unique in the sense that they contain both fixed and random effects. The 
fixed effects portion of the model is similar to a standard regression’s coefficients and is estimated 
directly. The random effects, however, are not estimated directly. Rather, the random effects are 
summarized in terms of their estimated variances and covariances. The random effects portion of 
the model may be included as random intercepts, random coefficients, or both.5  In addition, a 
mixed-effects model allows for the inclusion of time-invariant variables.6      
 
                                                          
4 In fact, as discussed by Wooldridge (2002, pages 273-274), estimates of cross-sectional-unit-specific intercepts “can contain 
substantial noise” when the number of time periods is small. Only when the number of time periods is large are these estimates 
“precise enough to learn something about [their] distribution.”  
5 Due to the fact mixed-effects models have more error terms, the model allows for more flexibility in defining the covariance 
structure. Having the ability to create a model with a more complex covariance structure improves the likelihood of correct 
specification. Therefore, the model will produce more precise estimates of the standard errors of regression coefficients with more 
accurate confidence intervals and statistical tests (Ferron et al.). 
6 An important limitation of the “fixed effects model” is the inability to include time-invariant variables. In a “fixed effects model,” 
identification is based on changes in the explanatory variables within a cross-sectional unit. Thus, the effect of any variable that 
does not change over time within a cross-sectional unit cannot be identified without additional assumptions. For example, see 
Wooldridge (2013, pages 464-462). 
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Consider the following formal model: 
Model 1: 
log(𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) = (𝛽0 + 𝛿0,𝑖) + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡−1  
+𝛽2 ⋅ (𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡−1 x 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1) 
+𝛽3 ⋅ (𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡−1 x 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1) 
+𝛽4 ⋅ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑿𝑖,𝑡 ⋅ 𝜷𝑋 + 𝑾𝑖,𝑡−1 ⋅ 𝜷𝑊 + 𝒁𝑖 ⋅ 𝜷𝑍 + 𝑲𝑗 ⋅ 𝜷𝐾 + 𝑺𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ⋅ 𝜷𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
for borough i, house type j, at time t.  𝑿𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of time specific control variables, 𝑾𝑖,𝑡−1 is a 
vector of lagged control variables, 𝒁𝑖 is a vector of time invariant control variables, 𝑲𝑗 is a vector 
of house type indicator variables, 𝑺𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is a vector of interaction variables between house type and 
total number of sales by type, and finally 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term. The control variables 
will be discussed in greater detail in the following section. 
  In our mixed-effects model, unobserved heterogeneity across boroughs is modeled by 
inclusion of borough-specific random intercepts, 𝛿0,𝑖, which vary each borough’s intercept around 
the estimated (mean) constant term, 𝛽0. This allows us to account for the clustered structure of our 
data. For this model we follow conventional methods for estimating linear mixed-effects models 
by assuming the random component follows a normal distribution and employing restricted 
maximum likelihood estimation.7  
 The two variables of primary interest contained in the model above are the interaction of 
the boom indicator and the planning induced supply constraint, and the interaction of the bust 
indicator and the planning induced supply constraint, where the bust indicator is equal to one minus 
the boom indicator. Interaction terms allow the effect one explanatory variable has on the 
dependent variable to depend on the value of another explanatory variable. Therefore, the first 
specified interaction allows us to observe the effect of planning induced supply constraints on 
                                                          
7 We assume the idiosyncratic error, 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡, is independent of 𝛿0,𝑖 , and that 𝛿0,𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝛿
2) and 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀
2 ).   
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house prices following a boom period. Similarly, the second specified interaction term allows us 
to observe the effect of planning induced supply constraints on house prices following a bust 
period. In order to obtain the true effect of these interaction terms on the dependent variable, the 
boom indicator must also be included in our model separately.8  
 In addition, the fixed effects portion of our model includes a simple linear time trend. By 
including time as an explanatory variable we are able to control for the effects of time in order to 
more accurately capture the effects of primary interest.9 
Hypothesis 
 Our hypotheses for our models, which are based on the economic theory discussed above, 
are listed in the table below. In a less restrictive environment, meaning when the percentage of 
applications accepted is high, we predict the average house price will be lower compared to a more 
restrictive environment following a boom period. We also predict that in a less restrictive 
environment the average house price will be higher compared to a more restrictive environment 
following a bust period.  
 Less Restrictive Environment More Restrictive Environment 
Prices following a Boom Period - + 
Prices following a Bust Period + - 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Please note that the interaction terms (boom) x (percentage of applications accepted) and (1-boom) x (percentage of applications 
accepted) is equivalent to including the percentage of applications accepted and the interaction term (boom) x (percentage of 
applications accepted).   
9 Through correlogram analysis we were able to determine our model does not require a moving average (MA) or autoregressive 
(AR) process.  
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3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics  
 Our sample for empirical analysis includes 32 of London’s 33 boroughs.10 These boroughs 
make up both Inner and Outer London. Figure 7 depicts the geographic borders of each borough. 
All variables were found for each borough in every year included in the observation period, which 
begins in 2001 and ends in 2013.11 The observation period includes 11 price boom periods and 
two price bust periods, which have been defined based on the overall house market trend.12 Our 
specified time period includes two partial booms phases and one full bust phase. These price trends 
can be seen in Figures 8 and 9 for the three most expensive and three least expensive boroughs.  
Figure 7: Map of London Boroughs 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics 
                                                          
10 Data collection in London’s 33rd borough, the City of London, is not consistent with other boroughs, forcing the omission of this 
borough. However, this exclusion does not pose a significant concern for our analysis. The total land area and residing population 
for this borough are significantly smaller compared to the other 32 boroughs, measuring less than half of the next smallest borough 
along both dimensions. In addition, the City of London is unlike any other borough due to its degree of self-government and 
relatively limited availability of residential property in comparison with other uses. 
11 Data previous to 2001 is not publically accessible and data post 2013 was not readily available at the time of our data pooling.    
12 Based on observed trends of both London and England’s housing market, bust periods have been defined as 2008 and 2009. 
All other years included in our observation period have been defined as boom periods.  
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Figure 8: Median House Prices 
 
 
Figure 9: Average House Prices 
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 The dependent variable in our model is the median price of homes by type for a given 
borough and year. The Land Registry provides these price paid data for four different types of 
homes: detached, semi-detached, terraced, and flats. Though no clear definition of these house 
types is provided by the Land Registry, we will rely on common definitions of the various types 
to better understand the differences. A detached house is defined as a single standing property that 
does not share any walls with any other adjacent structure. A semi-detached house is defined as a 
property where one side of the house shares a common wall with a neighboring structure, while 
the other side of the house is detached. A terraced house is defined as a property that is situated in 
a long row of houses sharing a common wall on both sides of the house (Property Investment 
Project). The Land Registry claims the last house type, flats, are difficult to define because there 
are many types. However, the Building Regulations 2000 define a flat as “a separate and self-
contained premises constructed or adapted for use for residential purposes and forming part of a 
building from some other part of which it is divided horizontally” (Planning Portal).  
 Trends of these data remain consistent with the overall house market trend and have been 
on the upswing since the beginning of our observation period, temporarily decreasing around 2008 
and 2009. Trends also show that London’s three most expensive boroughs have greater price 
changes compared to price changes in the three least expensive boroughs.13  
 Our measure of regulatory restrictiveness was obtained from the Planning Statistics group 
at the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). The DCLG provides data on 
the number of applications submitted and decided for major and minor residential development 
projects. A major residential project is defined as a project consisting of 10 or more dwellings, and 
                                                          
13 For certain boroughs, the number of sales for particular types of homes are low partially due to a low stock, which translates into 
additional noise in these price measures. After taking a natural log transformation of these price paid data, the observed price 
changes are more symmetric across boroughs and years.   
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a minor residential project is defined as a project consisting of fewer than 10 dwellings. While 
Hilber and Vermeulen’s model used the percentage of major applications accepted, our model will 
use the percentage of minor applications accepted. We claim the percentage of minor residential 
project applications accepted is a better measurement of regulatory restrictiveness because there 
are other factors that affect submission of major residential applications. Since major residential 
project applications require a significant amount of both money and time, among other things, to 
complete, it is reasonable to assume contractors are more likely to not submit an application for 
major projects if they do not believe it will be accepted. Minor residential project applications on 
the other hand require less time and money to complete and therefore more people would be willing 
to submit applications.  
 The application acceptance rate is included as a lagged variable in our model. We argue a 
change in the acceptance rate will not affect housing prices until the following year, which is when 
a housing plan will have had the chance to transition to a development and enter the market. 
 To keep the following interaction variables contemporaneous, the indicator variable for the 
state of the housing price cycle will also be lagged. Therefore, this indicator variable will define 
the state of the housing price cycle from the previous year, which is when the application decisions 
included in our model have been made. 
 Our model includes interaction terms between the regulatory supply constraint 
measurement and the state of the housing price cycle. This allows the effect regulatory supply 
constraints have on house prices to depend on the state of the housing price cycle. More 
specifically, the first of the two interaction terms in Model 1 allows us to observe how a change in 
the percentage of minor residential applications accepted in a boom year will affect the average 
20 
 
price of all homes for a given borough in the following year. The second of these interaction terms 
included in this model allows us to observe how a change in the percentage of minor residential 
applications accepted in a bust year will affect the average price of all homes for a given borough 
in the following year. 
 In addition, the fixed effects part of our multilevel mixed-effects model includes seven 
control variables. Controlling for the influence of other variables will allow us to observe a more 
accurate relationship between regulatory restrictiveness and house prices. The control variables 
are as follows: population, net migration, number of minor applications submitted, total land area 
of a borough, distance to the center of London, number of major residential development 
applications submitted, and number of house sales. 
 The first control variable included in our model is population. The annual borough 
population estimates are provided by the Greater London Authority. Including population as a 
variable in the fixed part of our model partially controls for the size of the market for a given 
borough.  
 The second control variable included in our model is net migration. Net migration for a 
given borough and year was generated by subtracting the number of people flowing out from the 
number of people flowing in. These data are provided by the Migration Statistics Unit from the 
Office for National Statistics. This variable serves as a control for the effect of unobservable 
attractions or deterrents for a given borough on house prices. 
 The number of minor residential project applications submitted in the previous year will 
serve as the third independent control variable. These data are provided by the Planning Statistics 
group at the Department for Communities and Local Government. Incorporating this variable in 
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our model will serve as a control for the planning and development climate in a given borough, as 
well as an additional control for the attractiveness of living in that borough.    
The total area of a borough will serve as the fourth independent control variable. These 
data are provided by the Greater London Authority. This variable allows us to control for the effect 
of total area on house prices. It is reasonable to suspect as the area of a borough increases, house 
prices will be lower because there is more room for expansion of the existing housing stock. 
 A distance measurement is included as the fifth control variable. The measurements were 
generated by finding the distance from the center of a given borough to the center of London, 
which we have defined as the center of the City of London. This variable serves as a control for 
the effect of central location on house prices. Urban economic theory tells us that as a household 
moves closer to the center of an urban area, the price will increase to account for the amenities 
available in the center, in addition to the savings on commuting. 
 In addition to including the number of minor residential project applications submitted in 
the previous year, our model also includes the number of major residential project applications 
submitted in the previous year. These data were also provided by the Planning Statistics group at 
the Department for Communities and Local Government. This variable allows us to further control 
for the development climate in a given borough. However, this control adds more weight to the 
development climate since these development applications require more commitment due to the 
cost associated with this type of application.14  
                                                          
14 Planning application fees are based on the total area of a site and the projected number of dwellings. For sites up to and including 
2.5 hectares, there is a £385 fee per 0.1 hectare. Applications that have a site larger than 2.5 hectares have a fixed fee of £9,527 and 
£115 fee per additional 0.1 hectare in excess of 2.5 hectares. Applications that project up to and including 50 new dwellings have 
a £385 fee per dwelling. For applications that project more than 50 new dwellings have a fixed fee of £19,049 and £115 fee per 
additional new dwelling in excess of 50. These fees are reported from the 2012 Town and Country Planning Regulations which 
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 The number of house sales by type of home will be the final control variable included in 
our model. These data are part of the House Price Statistics for Small Areas release, which is 
produced by the Office for National Statistics. This variable is included in our model to further 
control for the size of the market since it represents the number of housing transactions in a given 
borough.  
 Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables used in our model. These variables 
form a panel data set consisting of 32 boroughs for the years 2001 through 2013. The panel data 
allow us to control for unobservable, time-invariant effects specific to each borough, as well as for 
overall time trends, by using mixed-effects estimation.  
Table 1 
Summary Statistics (primary model sample) 
  Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
log(Median Sale Price of Detached Houses) 391 13.28 0.64 11.74 16.01 
log(Median Sale Price of Semi- Detached Houses) 391 12.85 0.66 11.64 15.61 
log(Median Sale Price of Terraced Houses) 391 12.64 0.58 11.45 14.85 
log(Median Sale Price of Flats) 391 12.23 0.39 11.13 13.62 
Percentage of Minor Development Applications Accepted 391 57.26 14.49 17.76 94.17 
Boom Indicator x Percentage of Minor Development Applications Accepted 391 50.50 24.23 0.00 93.06 
Bust Indicator x Percentage of Minor Development Applications Accepted 391 7.57 19.73 0.00 83.85 
Number of Major Residential Applications 391 28.05 21.27 0.00 127.00 
Number of Minor Residential Applications 391 243.50 152.57 25.00 982.00 
Population (in 1,000s) 391 244.31 53.96 146.00 375.80 
Total Area (SqKm) 391 49.09 31.12 12.12 150.13 
Net Migration (in 1,000s) 391 -2.21 2.29 -10.80 2.05 
Distance 391 8.20 3.91 1.29 15.47 
Number of Detached Sales 391 173.39 210.36 5.00 1275.00 
Number of Semi-Detached Sales 391 624.15 539.38 14.00 2219.00 
Number of Terraced Sales 391 1215.61 683.60 194.00 3267.00 
Number of Flat Sales 391 2055.58 1110.06 305.00 6320.00 
 
4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1 Estimation Strategy and Results  
                                                          
remain in effect in 2015.Though these fees are associated with only one period in our data set, these rates are provided to show the 
types of fees associated with these applications.  
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We report our primary model’s results in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Model 1: Main Results 
  Dependent Variable: log(Median Price by Specific Type of House) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fixed Effects           
Boom Indicator 0.217*** 0.220*** 0.218*** 0.212*** 0.240*** 
 (3.84) (3.90) (3.87) (3.76) (4.38) 
Boom Indicator x Percentage of Minor Applications Accepted -0.00143** -0.00148** -0.00150** -0.00142** -0.00149*** 
 (-2.41) (-2.49) (-2.53) (-2.39) (-2.59) 
Bust Indicator x Percentage of Minor Applications Accepted 0.00210** 0.00211** 0.00204** 0.00207** 0.00220** 
 (2.09) (2.09) (2.02) (2.05) (2.25) 
Home Type Indicator: Semi-Detached -0.426*** -0.426*** -0.426*** -0.426*** -0.342*** 
 (-29.95) (-29.95) (-29.95) (-29.99) (-17.38) 
Home Type Indicator: Terraced -0.644*** -0.644*** -0.644*** -0.644*** -0.574*** 
 (-45.28) (-45.29) (-45.29) (-45.34) (-23.09) 
Home Type Indicator: Flats  -1.056*** -1.056*** -1.056*** -1.056*** -0.875*** 
 (-74.26) (-74.27) (-74.26) (-74.35) (-32.75) 
Year 0.0640*** 0.0626*** 0.0638*** 0.0644*** 0.0614*** 
 (22.29) (21.53) (21.74) (21.81) (21.21) 
Population (in 1,000s) -0.00249*** -0.00205** -0.00248*** -0.00223*** -0.00228*** 
 (-3.09) (-2.51) (-2.99) (-2.66) (-2.78) 
Net Migration (in 1,000s) -0.0243*** -0.0239*** -0.0233*** -0.0217*** -0.0229*** 
 (-4.73) (-4.65) (-4.53) (-4.17) (-4.56) 
Number of Minor Residential Applications 0.000344*** 0.000350*** 0.000343*** 0.000310*** 0.000303*** 
 (6.56) (6.68) (6.54) (5.61) (5.67) 
Total Area of Borough (SqKm)  -0.00583** 0.000358 -0.000166 0.000239 
  (-2.38) (0.10) (-0.04) (0.06) 
Distance (miles)   -0.0610** -0.0584** -0.0610** 
   (-2.14) (-2.03) (-2.09) 
Number of Major Residential Applications    0.000745** 0.000846** 
    (1.97) (2.31) 
Detached Indicator x Number of Detached Sales     0.0000966* 
     (1.76) 
Semi-Detached Indicator x Number of Semi-Detached Sales     -0.000108*** 
     (-5.09) 
Terraced Indicator x Number of Terraced Sales     -0.0000437*** 
     (-2.72) 
Flat Indicator x Number of Flat Sales     -0.0000798*** 
     (-8.08) 
Constant 13.12*** 13.31*** 13.60*** 13.53*** 13.53*** 
  (62.12) (60.59) (53.74) (52.72) (53.13) 
Random Effect           
Variance: Borough Specific Intercept 0.2056606 0.1793952 0.1590960 0.1624608 0.1672646 
95% CI: Lower Bound 0.1240333 0.1075419 0.0943182 0.0961506 0.0991316 
95% CI: Upper Bound 0.3410076 0.2992567 0.2683634 0.2745018 0.2822248 
Variance of Residual 0.0396943 0.0396894 0.0396941 0.0396045 0.0369787 
Number of Observations 1576 1576 1576 1576 1576 
Number of Boroughs 32 32 32 32 32 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.      
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Columns (1) through (5) provide estimates of primary interest which are the interaction 
terms boom period x percentage of minor residential applications accepted and bust period x 
percentage of minor residential applications accepted, where bust period equals one minus boom 
period. Estimates in Column (1), which includes only three of our control variables, provide 
evidence corresponding to our hypothesis at the 5 percent significance level. As additional controls 
are added, the estimates of primary interest remain both consistent with our hypothesis and 
statistically significant. Details are discussed in the following paragraphs.  
Estimates in Column (1) indicate that if the percentage of minor residential applications 
accepted increases by 1 percentage point during a boom period, when holding all other explanatory 
variables constant, the median price for each type of home will be, on average, 0.143 percent lower 
in the following year compared to house prices in an equivalent borough that did not experience 
the acceptance increase. It is important to keep in mind that this coefficient is the effect of 
residential application acceptance during a boom period, a period when house prices are rising. 
The negative coefficient does not imply that house prices decrease in boroughs with higher 
acceptance rates. Rather, prices do not increase by as much in boroughs with higher acceptance 
rates, compared to boroughs with lower acceptance rates. This estimate is significant at the 5 
percent level.  
Estimates in Column (1) also indicate that if the percentage of minor residential 
applications accepted increases by 1 percentage point during a bust period, when holding all other 
explanatory variables constant, the median price for each type of home will be, on average, 0.21 
percent higher in the following year compared to house prices in an equivalent borough that did 
not experience the acceptance increase. Just as the negative coefficient discussed in the previous 
paragraph did not imply that house prices decrease, the positive coefficient presented in this 
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paragraph does not imply that house prices increase in boroughs with higher acceptance rates. 
Rather, prices do not fall by as much in boroughs with higher acceptance rates, compared to 
boroughs with lower acceptance rates. This estimate is also significant at the 5 percent level.  
Columns (2), (3), and (4) add additional control variables to the specification found in 
Column (1). Total land area, distance to the center of London, and the number of major 
applications submitted are added to the specification, respectively.  
Column (4) provides estimates for our model when all control variables, except for the 
number of sales, are included. These estimates indicate that if the percentage of minor residential 
applications accepted during a boom period increases by 1 percentage point, when holding all other 
explanatory variables constant, the median price for each type of home will be, on average, 0.142 
percent lower in the following year compared to house prices in an equivalent borough that did 
not experience the acceptance increase. Estimates in Column (4) also indicate that if the percentage 
of minor residential applications accepted during a bust period increases by 1 percentage point, 
when holding all other explanatory variables constant, the median price for each type of home will 
be, on average, 0.207 percent higher in the following year compared to house prices in an 
equivalent borough that did not experience the acceptance increase. Both estimates remain 
significant at the 5 percent level. 
 Estimates in Column (5), which includes number of sales by house type as control 
variables, indicate that if the percentage of minor residential applications accepted increases by 1 
percentage point during a boom period, when holding all other explanatory variables constant, the 
median price for each type of home will be, on average, 0.149 percent lower in the following year 
compared to house prices in an equivalent borough that did not experience the acceptance increase. 
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Estimates in Column (5) also indicate that if the percentage of minor residential applications 
accepted increases by 1 percentage point during a bust period, when holding all other explanatory 
variables constant, the median price for each type of home will be, on average, 0.22 percent higher 
in the following year compared to house prices in an equivalent borough that did not experience 
the acceptance increase. These coefficients remain essentially unchanged across previous 
specifications. In addition, the level of significance remains the same, if not improved.   
4.2 Robustness Checks  
In this section we provide results for several alternative specifications to demonstrate the 
robustness of the results discussed above. We provide a model (Model 2) that removes the linear 
time trend from our preferred model (Model 1). Estimates for Model 2 can be found in Table 3.15 
The estimates show that our expected results continue to hold when excluding the time control. 
However, the level of the effect for the interaction of a boom period and percentage of minor 
applications accepted on median house prices more than doubles when the time trend is excluded. 
Also, the level of the effect for the interaction of a bust period and percentage of minor applications 
accepted on median house prices is marginally larger compared to the estimates with a linear time 
trend. Though the significance of these estimates improves in Model 2, we provide this model to 
show that the expected effects on house prices hold true with and without the inclusion of a linear 
time trend.16   
 
 
                                                          
15 A formal equation for Model 2 can be found in the appendix.   
16 Through analysis of our data, we were able to validate that our model does not warrant AR or MA processes. However, Models 
2 and 4 encourage the inclusion of a linear time trend making the estimates more robust and unbiased in Model 1, the preferred 
model.  
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Table 3 
Model 2: Primary Model without Linear Time Trend 
  Dependent Variable: log(Median Price by Specific Type of House) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fixed Effects           
Boom Indicator 0.295*** 0.296*** 0.296*** 0.295*** 0.329*** 
 (4.70) (4.71) (4.71) (4.68) (5.40) 
Boom Indicator x Percentage of Minor Applications Accepted -0.00306*** -0.00310*** -0.00308*** -0.00306*** -0.00302*** 
 (-4.64) (-4.70) (-4.66) (-4.62) (-4.74) 
Bust Indicator x Percentage of Minor Applications Accepted 0.00271** 0.00267** 0.00269** 0.00271** 0.00292*** 
 (2.41) (2.37) (2.39) (2.40) (2.68) 
Home Type Indicator: Semi-Detached -0.427*** -0.427*** -0.427*** -0.427*** -0.334*** 
 (-26.87) (-26.87) (-26.87) (-26.87) (-15.21) 
Home Type Indicator: Terraced -0.644*** -0.644*** -0.644*** -0.645*** -0.562*** 
 (-40.60) (-40.59) (-40.60) (-40.59) (-20.28) 
Home Type Indicator: Flats  -1.056*** -1.056*** -1.056*** -1.056*** -0.861*** 
 (-66.54) (-66.53) (-66.54) (-66.53) (-28.91) 
Population (in 1,000s) 0.0135*** 0.0135*** 0.0135*** 0.0136*** 0.0126*** 
 (25.45) (25.45) (25.46) (23.49) (21.97) 
Net Migration (in 1,000s) -0.0118** -0.0109* -0.0112* -0.0107* -0.0127** 
 (-2.06) (-1.89) (-1.94) (-1.84) (-2.26) 
Number of Minor Residential Applications 0.000609*** 0.000609*** 0.000610*** 0.000599*** 0.000575*** 
 (10.69) (10.68) (10.70) (10.05) (9.99) 
Total Area of Borough (SqKm)  -0.0181*** -0.0248*** -0.0251*** -0.0229*** 
  (-3.88) (-3.41) (-3.41) (-3.28) 
Distance (miles)   0.0688 0.0702 0.0595 
   (1.19) (1.20) (1.08) 
Number of Major Residential Applications    0.000242 0.000375 
    (0.57) (0.92) 
Detached Indicator x Number of Detached Sales     0.0000379 
     (0.62) 
Semi-Detached Indicator x Number of Semi-Detached Sales     -0.000139*** 
     (-5.88) 
Terraced Indicator x Number of Terraced Sales     -0.0000624*** 
     (-3.49) 
Flat Indicator x Number of Flat Sales     -0.0000917*** 
     (-8.34) 
Constant 9.693*** 10.60*** 10.35*** 10.32*** 10.52*** 
 (40.76) (34.39) (27.98) (27.35) (29.21) 
Random Effect           
Variance: Borough Specific Intercept 1.0237110 0.6992752 0.6928703 0.7043979 0.6354198 
95% CI: Lower Bound 0.6153264 0.4151390 0.4085817 0.4142287 0.3734061 
95% CI: Upper Bound 1.7031360 1.1778850 1.1749650 1.1978320 1.0812850 
Variance of Residual 0.0495188 0.0495249 0.0495202 0.0495267 0.0459763 
Number of Observations 1576 1576 1576 1576 1576 
Number of Boroughs 32 32 32 32 32 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.      
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To show that our results are robust to the measure of housing prices, Models 3 and 4 use 
the median price of all types of homes17 as the dependent variable instead of the median price of 
four different types of homes. This alteration to the dependent variable requires us to omit the 
vector of house type indicators. In addition, for specification (5) of Model 3 and 4, the number of 
house sales is for all types of houses instead of each type of house individually, as was included in 
specification (5) of Models 1 and 2. Models 3 and 4 are otherwise identical to Models 1 and 2.18 
Estimates for Model 3 are shown in Table 4. The table shows that our results still hold for 
this new definition of the dependent variable. Estimates in Column (5) indicate that if the 
percentage of minor residential applications accepted during a boom period increases by 1 
percentage point, when holding all other explanatory variables constant, the median price of homes 
will be, on average, 0.0889 percent lower in the following year compared to house prices in an 
equivalent borough that did not experience the acceptance increase. This estimate is significant at 
the 5 percent level. However, the effect of a change in the percentage of minor residential 
applications accepted during a boom period is slightly smaller on the median price of all homes 
than on the median price for each type of home. Estimates in Column (5) also indicate that if the 
percentage of minor residential applications accepted during a bust increases by 1 percentage 
point, when holding all other explanatory variables constant, the median price of homes will be, 
on average, 0.163 percent higher in the following year compared to house prices in an equivalent 
borough that did not experience the acceptance increase. This estimate is significant at the 5 
percent level. Similar to the previous interaction, the effect of a change in the percentage of minor 
                                                          
17 This price paid for housing data is also provided by the Land Registry.  
18 Formal equations for Model 2 and Model 3 can be found in the appendix.   
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residential applications accepted during a bust period is slightly smaller on the median price of all 
homes than on the median price for each type of home. 
Table 4 
Model 3: Alternative Model with Different Dependent Variable 
  Dependent Variable: log(Median Price of All House Types) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fixed Effects           
Boom Indicator 0.177*** 0.178*** 0.177*** 0.169*** 0.132*** 
 (4.41) (4.43) (4.40) (4.27) (3.33) 
Boom Indicator x Percentage of Minor Applications Accepted -0.000920** -0.000943** -0.000967** -0.000881** -0.000889** 
 (-2.17) (-2.21) (-2.27) (-2.09) (-2.17) 
Bust Indicator x Percentage of Minor Applications Accepted 0.00199*** 0.00198*** 0.00192*** 0.00194*** 0.00163** 
 (2.78) (2.76) (2.68) (2.74) (2.36) 
Year 0.0611*** 0.0607*** 0.0616*** 0.0624*** 0.0661*** 
 (31.73) (30.45) (30.46) (30.88) (31.19) 
Population (in 1,000s) -0.00282*** -0.00270*** -0.00300*** -0.00278*** -0.00268*** 
 (-5.41) (-4.96) (-5.39) (-4.99) (-4.93) 
Net Migration (in 1,000s) -0.0209*** -0.0208*** -0.0204*** -0.0186*** -0.0173*** 
 (-5.73) (-5.68) (-5.57) (-5.07) (-4.82) 
Number of Minor Residential Applications 0.000293*** 0.000294*** 0.000289*** 0.000251*** 0.000257*** 
 (7.84) (7.86) (7.70) (6.42) (6.77) 
Total Area of Borough (SqKm)  -0.00108 0.00257 0.00208 0.00137 
  (-0.76) (1.18) (0.95) (0.64) 
Distance (miles)   -0.0356** -0.0332** -0.0304* 
   (-2.14) (-1.99) (-1.87) 
Number of Major Residential Applications    0.000818*** 0.000696*** 
    (3.06) (2.66) 
Number of House Sales     0.0000212*** 
     (4.72) 
Constant 12.40*** 12.43*** 12.61*** 12.55*** 12.46*** 
 (92.43) (89.39) (78.15) (77.38) (78.28) 
Random Effect           
Variance: Borough Specific Intercept 0.0578956 0.0582020 0.0526559 0.0531479 0.0506512 
95% CI: Lower Bound 0.0347631 0.0345751 0.0311930 0.0315235 0.0300397 
95% CI: Upper Bound 0.0964214 0.0979744 0.0888869 0.0896063 0.0854051 
Variance of Residual 0.0051003 0.0051041 0.0050968 0.0049762 0.0047129 
Number of Observations 395 395 395 395 395 
Number of Boroughs 32 32 32 32 32 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.      
     
 
Table 5 provides estimates for Model 4. Model 4 is analogous to Model 2 with the 
exception of redefining the dependent variable to be the median price of all types of homes. Like 
Model 2, we exclude the linear time trend to emphasize the robustness of our specified model. 
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Similar to all specifications of Models 1 and 2, the following estimates show that our expected 
results hold when excluding the time control. However, the level of the effect for the interaction 
of a boom period and percentage of minor applications accepted on the median price of all homes 
more than doubles when the time trend is excluded. This result is consistent with the difference 
between Models 1 and 2. Also, the level of the effect for the interaction of a bust period and 
percentage of minor applications accepted on the median price of all homes is marginally larger 
compared to the estimates with a linear time trend. Again, this result is consistent with the 
difference between Models 1 and 2 and further emphasizes the robustness of our specified models. 
Results from Model 4 assert that our selected control variables are indeed sufficient, whether we 
redefine the dependent variable or not.   
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Table 5 
Model 4: Alternative Model with Different Dependent Variable and No Linear Time Trend 
  Dependent Variable: log(Median Price of All House Types) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fixed Effects           
Boom Indicator 0.251*** 0.253*** 0.253*** 0.252*** 0.291*** 
 (3.59) (3.60) (3.61) (3.59) (4.11) 
Boom Indicator x Percentage of Minor Applications Accepted -0.00254*** -0.00261*** -0.00255*** -0.00254*** -0.00245*** 
 (-3.43) (-3.52) (-3.45) (-3.42) (-3.31) 
Bust Indicator x Percentage of Minor Applications Accepted 0.00251** 0.00244 0.00250** 0.00251** 0.00280** 
 (2.00) (1.95) (1.99) (1.99) (2.23) 
Population (in 1,000s) 0.0119*** 0.0118*** 0.0119*** 0.0119*** 0.0106*** 
 (20.27) (20.26) (20.31) (18.72) (14.61) 
Net Migration (in 1,000s) -0.00593 -0.00461 -0.00505 -0.00483 -0.00655 
 (-0.92) (-0.72) (-0.79) (-0.74) (-1.01) 
Number of Minor Residential Applications 0.000549*** 0.000547*** 0.000550*** 0.000545*** 0.000519*** 
 (8.58) (8.56) (8.61) (8.14) (7.73) 
Total Area of Borough (SqKm)  -0.0127*** -0.0209*** -0.0211*** -0.0183*** 
  (-3.36) (-3.67) (-3.66) (-3.45) 
Distance (miles)   0.0849 0.0855 0.0721 
   (1.88) (1.88) (1.74) 
Number of Major Residential Applications    0.000117 0.000256 
    (0.25) (0.54) 
Number of House Sales     0.0000253*** 
     (-3.30) 
Constant 9.283*** 9.927*** 9.620*** 9.602*** 9.964*** 
 (41.95) (36.67) (30.59) (29.82) (31.45) 
Random Effect           
Variance: Borough Specific Intercept 0.6105728 0.4520969 0.4204248 0.4250910 0.3507706 
95% CI: Lower Bound 0.3611753 0.2632498 0.2436364 0.2447062 0.1978949 
95% CI: Upper Bound 1.0321830 0.7764171 0.7254953 0.7384454 0.6217443 
Variance of Residual 0.015613 0.0156266 0.0156137 0.015641 0.0154748 
Number of Observations 395 395 395 395 395 
Number of Boroughs 32 32 32 32 32 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.      
     
 
  Model 5 is the final mixed-effects model we include as a robustness check. Model 5 is 
analogous to our primary model (Model 1) with the exception of altering a few of the control 
parameters. Instead of including both population and total area, Model 5 supplements these 
controls by including population density. The intuition behind changing these parameters 
addresses potential apprehensiveness of including two similar controls for the size of the market, 
population and number of sales. Though the correlation estimate between these two variables is 
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low (0.3058), we removed these two controls and replaced them with a similar substitute to 
reaffirm that our model specification is robust. Results for this model are located in Table 6.  
Estimates in Column (3) indicate that if the percentage of minor applications accepted 
during a boom period increases by 1 percentage point, when holding all other explanatory variables 
constant, the median price for each type of home will be, on average, 0.156 percent lower in the 
following year compared to house prices in an equivalent borough that did not experience the 
acceptance increase. This estimate is significant at the 1 percent level. Estimates in Column (3) 
also indicate that if the percentage of minor applications accepted during a bust period increases 
by 1 percentage point, when holding all other explanatory variables constant, the median price for 
each type of home will be, on average, 0.237 percent higher in the following year compared to 
house prices in an equivalent borough that did not experience the acceptance increase. This 
estimate is significant at the 5 percent level. Both estimates are comparable to Model 1’s estimates. 
Results from Model 5 allow us to assert again that our selected control variables are indeed 
sufficient, whether we redefine the parameters of the controls or not.  
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Table 6 
Model 5: Alternative Model with Different Control Measures 
  
Dependent Variable:  
log(Median Price by Specific Type of House) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Fixed Effects       
Boom Indicator 0.257*** 0.256*** 0.244*** 
 (4.70) (4.70) (4.49) 
Boom Indicator x Percentage of Minor Applications Accepted -0.00168*** -0.00169*** -0.00156*** 
 (-2.93) (-2.93) (-2.72) 
Bust Indicator x Percentage of Minor Applications Accepted 0.00238** 0.00237** 0.00237** 
 (2.44) (2.44) (2.44) 
Home Type Indicator: Semi-Detached -0.341*** -0.341*** -0.341*** 
 (-17.33) (-17.33) (-17.40) 
Home Type Indicator: Terraced -0.579*** -0.579*** -0.578*** 
 (-23.32) (-23.32) (-23.35) 
Home Type Indicator: Flats  -0.879*** -0.879*** -0.876*** 
 (-32.94) (-32.92) (-32.94) 
Detached Indicator x Number of Detached Sales 0.0000815 0.0000815 0.0000810 
 (1.49) (1.49) (1.48) 
Semi-Detached Indicator x Number of Semi-Detached Sales -0.000115*** -0.000115*** -0.000115*** 
 (-5.41) (-5.39) (-5.40) 
Terraced Indicator x Number of Terraced Sales -0.0000421*** -0.0000421*** -0.0000433*** 
 (-2.63) (-2.62) (-2.71) 
Flat Indicator x Number of Flat Sales -0.0000794*** -0.0000794*** -0.0000806*** 
 (-8.05) (-8.05) (-8.19) 
Year 0.0467*** 0.0467*** 0.0482*** 
 (23.30) (21.22) (21.53) 
Population Density (people per hectare) 0.00817*** 0.00814*** 0.00896*** 
 (5.70) (4.39) (4.80) 
Net Migration (in 1,000s) -0.0279*** -0.0279*** -0.0254*** 
 (-5.65) (-5.62) (-5.07) 
Number of Minor Residential Applications 0.000382*** 0.000381*** 0.000324*** 
 (7.61) (7.59) (6.12) 
Distance (miles)  -0.000366 0.00522 
  (-0.02) (0.23) 
Number of Major Residential Applications   0.00122*** 
   (3.35) 
Constant 12.05*** 12.05*** 11.93*** 
 (96.46) (42.67) (41.81) 
Random Effect       
Variance: Borough Specific Intercept 0.1464179 0.1497698 0.1525976 
95% CI: Lower Bound 0.0881329 0.0894606 0.0912575 
95% CI: Upper Bound 0.2432484 0.2507361 0.2551681 
Variance of Residual 0.0369373 0.0369451 0.0366861 
Number of Observations 1576 1576 1576 
Number of Boroughs 32 32 32 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.    
    
 
 The four models previously discussed in this section are provided to emphasize our 
confidence in correctly fitting our multilevel mixed-effects model to the data. However, should the 
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reader be apprehensive about our model’s estimation procedure, we provide an alternative model 
(Model 6) with similar specifications using ordinary least squares (OLS) fixed effects estimation, 
traditionally a more popular empirical model in economics.  
 Table 7 presents the findings of our “fixed effects model.” This model’s estimated effects 
for the two primary variables of interest on house prices remain both consistent with our hypothesis 
and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Further, these estimates and their statistical 
significance are remarkably similar to those found in Model 1. Comparing the final columns of 
Tables 2 and 7, we see that the estimated effect of a 1 percentage point increase in minor residential 
applications accepted on the median price of each type of home is almost identical in each model, 
-0.160 percent during a boom period and 0.211 percent during a bust period from the “fixed effects 
model” compared with -0.149 percent during a boom period and 0.220 percent during a bust period 
from Model 1. 
Though these estimates are consistent with those in our primary model, we wish to warn 
the reader for the reasons discussed in Section 3 that restricted maximum likelihood estimation of 
the mixed-effects Model 1 remains superior to OLS estimation of the “fixed effects model.” A 
major benefit of the mixed-effects model is highlighted by simple inspection of Tables 2 and 7. 
Table 7 only includes three specifications, while Table 2 includes five. The reasons for this 
difference are the measures of borough size and location that are included in Model 1 but that 
cannot be included in the “fixed effects model.” According to well-established urban economic 
theory, location is an important contributing factor to house prices.19 This theory is corroborated 
by the estimates in Columns (3) through (5) of Table 2. Holding the other explanatory variables 
                                                          
19 In fact, the three golden rules of real estate are “location, location, location.” 
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constant, a one mile increase in a borough’s distance from the center of London is predicted to 
decrease the borough’s median house price by around six percent. The inability to include time-
invariant explanatory variables is a significant limitation of the “fixed effects” approach to settings 
with unobserved heterogeneity.  
Table 7 
Model 5: OLS “Fixed Effects Model” 
  
Dependent Variable:  
log(Median Price by Specific Type of House) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Fixed Effects       
Boom Indicator 0.218339*** 0.2119466*** 0.2397704*** 
 (5.705863) (5.252786) (5.350603) 
Boom Indicator x Percentage of Minor Applications Accepted -0.0016193** -0.0015327* -0.0015967** 
 (-2.164655) (-2.004056) (-2.119299) 
Bust Indicator x Percentage of Minor Applications Accepted 0.0019403** 0.0019791** 0.0021072** 
 (2.589649) (2.524309) (2.612969) 
Home Type Indicator: Semi-Detached -0.425755*** -0.4257939*** -0.3422412*** 
 (-11.23725) (-11.23684) (-6.730717) 
Home Type Indicator: Terraced -0.6437092*** -0.6437481*** -0.5760858*** 
 (-14.1832) (-14.18311) (-9.888268) 
Home Type Indicator: Flats  -1.055572*** -1.055611*** -0.8732066*** 
 (-17.79148) (-17.78862) (-10.07085) 
Year 0.0627546*** 0.0631258*** 0.0603883*** 
 (9.729712) (9.815469) (10.23309) 
Population (in 1,000s) -0.0020672 -0.0016931 -0.0018411 
 (-1.422586) (-1.20378) (-1.266999) 
Net Migration (in 1,000s) -0.0243454*** -0.0227393** -0.0238476** 
 (-2.775249) (-2.514388) (-2.62007) 
Number of Minor Residential Applications 0.0003339*** 0.0002981*** 0.0002915*** 
 (4.028193) (3.581345) (3.452312) 
Number of Major Residential Applications  0.0008167* 0.0009063* 
  (1.850964) (1.973774) 
Detached Indicator x Number of Detached Sales   0.0000955 
   (.6800293) 
Semi-Detached Indicator x Number of Semi-Detached Sales   -0.0001081** 
   (-2.145539) 
Terraced Indicator x Number of Terraced Sales   -0.0000422 
   (-1.571006) 
Flat Indicator x Number of Flat Sales   -0.0000807** 
   -2.313485 
Constant 13.03828*** 12.93417*** 12.9502*** 
  (41.64652) (42.62079) (40.55315) 
Number of Observations 1576 1576 1576 
Number of Boroughs 32 32 32 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered by borough. All columns are 
estimated by OLS. Regressions include borough fixed effects. 
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As a final robustness check, we will assess the fit of our model using deviance analysis. 
Deviance measures the fit between a model and a given data set, and is calculated by multiplying 
the log-likelihood by negative two. A model’s deviance can then be compared to that of other 
models, with the smallest deviance indicating best fitness. However, because adding additional 
independent variables to a model almost always increases the log likelihood and thus decreases 
the deviance, in order to make an honest comparison of the deviance across model specifications, 
it is necessary to account for the number of new predictors added to the model. This can be done 
by simply adding the number of total predictors to the deviance estimate and is known as the 
adjusted deviance.20 As additional explanatory variables are added to a model, the adjusted 
deviance will only decrease, indicating a better fit, if the deviance decreases by more than the 
number of parameters added to the model. In this way, “adjusted deviance can be used as an 
adjusted measure that approximately accounts for the increase in fit attained simply by adding 
predictors to a model” (Gelman and Hill, 525).21 Additionally, we assess Akaike’s Information 
Criteria (AIC) for each model, which allows us to test out-of-sample predictive power.22 These fit 
statistics for our primary model (Model 1) are reported in Table 8.  
First consider Columns (1) through (4). Column (1) provides model fit statistics for our 
primary model when only including house type indicators and a linear time trend. In Column (2), 
we see that when additional control parameters are included both the adjusted deviance and AIC 
decrease, which signals improvement in the fit of the model. When our primary variables of 
interest are added in Column (3), both measures decrease further, indicating additional 
                                                          
20 Gelman and Hill claim adjusted deviance is analogous to the adjusted 𝑅2 in simple linear regression (525). 
21 “If k predictors are added and the deviance declines by significantly more than k, then we can conclude that the observed 
improvement in predictive power is statistically significant” (Gelman and Hill, 525).    
22 AIC measures the fit of a model for a given set of data, where AIC = adjusted deviance + number of predictors. 
37 
 
improvement in model fit. To show this improvement is not coincidental, we replace the three 
primary variables with three random variables that follow a normal distribution with a mean of 
zero and standard deviation equivalent to that of the specific variable they replace. Column (4) 
reports the fitness measurements for this specification. We expected the inclusion of our primary 
variables of interest to improve the fit of the model, but we expect to find no such evidence of 
improved fit here when the additional variables are nothing but random noise. Indeed, this is what 
we find; both the adjusted deviance and AIC are larger compared to Column (3)’s values, while 
the deviance itself is essentially unchanged from Column (2).  
Now consider Columns (5) through (7). These specifications follow a progression similar 
to that just discussed for Columns (2) through (4), except with the inclusion of number of sales by 
house type. Column (5) provides fitness measurements for our primary model when including 
number of sales by house type and excluding our three primary variables. Both the adjusted 
deviance and AIC decrease compared to statistics reported in Column (2), which signals an 
improvement in the fit of our model when the number of sales by house type is included as a 
control. When adding our three primary variables of interest in Column (6), we observe an 
additional decrease in both adjusted deviance and AIC. Again, to show this improvement is not 
coincidental, we replace the three primary variables with the same randomly generated variables 
included in Column (4). Interpretation of Column (7)’s deviance statistics remains consistent with 
Column (4)’s interpretation.23  
The fitness measurements reported in Table 8 provide statistical support for our decision 
to include the specified control variables in Model 1 and, most importantly, support the inclusion 
                                                          
23 Likelihood ratio tests comparing the same models compared using deviance analysis were also conducted with identical 
conclusions. 
38 
 
of our three primary variables. When adding our primary variables of interest, we are able to 
improve the fit of our model, which signals the percentage of minor applications accepted during 
a boom or bust period plays an important role in predicting house prices. This in turn reinforces 
our argument that there is indeed an effect of planning authority leniency during boom or bust 
periods on house prices, and that effect not only aligns with what economic theory tells us, but is 
also statistically significant at the 5 percent level, or better.  
Table 8 
Model Checking Using Deviance Statistics 
  Model Comparison 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Boom Indicator No No Yes No No Yes No 
Boom Indicator x Percentage of Minor Applications Accepted No No Yes No No Yes No 
Bust Indicator x Percentage of Minor Applications Accepted No No Yes No No Yes No 
Home Type Indicator: Semi-Detached Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Home Type Indicator: Terraced Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Home Type Indicator: Flats  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Population (in 1,000s) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Net Migration (in 1,000s) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Minor Residential Applications No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Total Area of Borough (SqKm) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Distance (miles) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Major Residential Applications No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Detached Indicator x Number of Detached Sales No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Semi-Detached Indicator x Number of Semi-Detached Sales No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Terraced Indicator x Number of Terraced Sales No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Flat Indicator x Number of Flat Sales No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Random Variable 1: N(0,0.3479905) No No No Yes No No Yes 
Random Variable 2: N(0,24.33832) No No No Yes No No Yes 
Random Variable 3: N(0,19.94635) No No No Yes No No Yes 
Number of Observations 1576 1576 1576 1576 1576 1576 1576 
Number of Parameters 7 13 16 16 17 20 20 
Deviance -336.69 -444.38 -460.43 -444.64 -546.85 -569.47 -547.13 
Adjusted Deviance -329.69 -431.38 -444.43 -428.64 -529.85 -549.47 -527.13 
AIC -322.69 -418.38 -428.43 -412.64 -512.85 -529.47 -507.13 
Deviance = -2(log-likelihood)         Adjusted Deviance = -2(log-likelihood) + k         AIC = -2(log-likelihood) + 2k , where k is the number of parameters 
Estimates in this table are compared across models with changing fixed effects parameters and unchanged random effects. 
Dependent variable is median price by house type. Log-likelihoods for these estimates were generated under maximum likelihood estimation. 
All fit statistics included in this table can be interpreted as “smaller-is-better.”   
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5 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF RESULTS 
 Our empirical results are consistent with our hypothesis both following a boom period and 
bust period. We observe that when regulatory restrictiveness increases during a boom period, 
meaning housing supply is becoming more inelastic because fewer applications for residential 
projects are being accepted, resulting in less new development, then house prices will be higher in 
the following year compared to a less restrictive market holding all else equal. Alternatively, when 
regulatory restrictiveness decreases, meaning housing supply is becoming more elastic because 
more applications for residential projects are being accepted, resulting in more new development, 
then house prices will not rise as rapidly compared to a more restrictive market. This implies, given 
a price boom, house prices will be lower in areas that have a more lenient planning authority and 
house prices will be higher in areas that have a stricter planning authority.  
 Our empirical results also remain consistent with our hypothesis following a price bust. 
We observe that when regulatory restrictiveness increases during a bust period, meaning housing 
supply is becoming more inelastic, then house prices will be lower compared to a less restrictive 
market holding all else equal. Alternatively, given the previous year was a bust, when regulatory 
restrictiveness decreases, meaning housing supply is becoming more elastic, then house prices will 
decrease less than under more restrictive regulation. This implies, given the previous period was a 
bust, house prices will be higher in areas that have a more lenient planning authority and house 
prices will be lower in areas that have a stricter planning authority.  
 These results indicate that when a planning authority is stricter by having a low acceptance 
rate of residential planning applications, then house prices in that area will grow higher during a 
boom and will fall by more during a bust. Therefore, price changes will be greater compared to 
areas with less restrictive planning authorities.  
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 Though our hypotheses hold true, there are several opportunities for improvement that 
warrant further exploration. One is a more detailed examination of the residential project 
development application process. In the UK, applications for new residential projects are divided 
into “minor” projects with fewer than ten dwellings and “major” projects with ten or more 
dwellings. In Section 3 we argued why it is sensible to use the acceptance rate of applications for 
minor residential projects as the measure of regulatory restrictiveness. However, an examination 
of alternative measures may deepen our understanding of the effect of supply constraints on 
housing prices. In addition, a careful consideration of any potential endogeneity in the application 
and approval process may also prove fruitful.24  
 In future work we would also like to obtain data with more observations across both 
boroughs and years. This would allow us to examine if the nature of the relationship between 
planning induced supply constraints and house prices is different in other UK metropolitan areas, 
and if so, to what extent. Having a richer data set with areas that are geographically separated from 
the boroughs of London may also allow us to better control for any potential spillover effects. This 
concern arises due to the close proximity of London’s boroughs, which potentially allows nearby 
boroughs to be substitutes for both housing supply and demand.  
 In addition, it would be informative to see how policy changes have affected house prices 
in London. Specifically, what policy changes have created either housing supply or demand 
shocks, e.g., loan rate or loan acceptance changes? Furthermore, it would be informative to see 
how foreign investment in London’s residential real estate market has affected housing supply and 
demand. For example, Green and Bentley claim that London Property Partners found that up to 85 
                                                          
24 For example, if decision makers of a borough’s planning authority were to read this paper, how might that affect their future 
planning decisions? 
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percent of prime London property purchases in 2012 were made with foreign money and, therefore, 
the nature of foreign investment is distorting residential development priorities towards more 
luxury real estate.  
6 CONCLUSION 
 Using data from 32 of London’s boroughs, our study empirically examines how planning 
induced supply constraints affect the median price of houses following a boom period and a bust 
period between 2001 and 2013. Our analysis reveals that a borough with a strict planning authority 
will have higher house prices following a boom period and lower house prices following a bust 
period compared to prices in a borough with a more lenient planning authority. Therefore, house 
prices in a more restrictive environment with an inelastic housing supply change faster than prices 
in a less restrictive environment with a more elastic housing supply. As stated previously in this 
paper, not only are high housing prices of concern, but so too are fast changes in asset prices, both 
of which can have severe economic consequences. Understanding these partial root causes of the 
current state of London’s residential real estate market is an important step towards ensuring not 
just the market’s success, but also London’s success.  
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APPENDIX 
This appendix includes the regression equations for Models 2, 3, and 4 that were not 
included in the body of the paper. The equation for Model 1 is also included for ease of comparison. 
In each equation, 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 is an indicator variable equal to one in periods of economy-
wide rising house prices, 𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 = 1 − 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟, and percentage of minor 
applications accepted is the percentage that are accepted of all applications received for residential 
development projects affecting fewer than ten dwellings. 
 
Model 1: linear time trend 
log(𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) = (𝛽0 + 𝛿0,𝑖) + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡−1  
+𝛽2 ⋅ (𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡−1 x 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1) 
+𝛽3 ⋅ (𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡−1 x 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1) 
+𝛽4 ⋅ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑿𝑖,𝑡 ⋅ 𝜷𝑋 + 𝑾𝑖,𝑡−1 ⋅ 𝜷𝑊 + 𝒁𝑖 ⋅ 𝜷𝑍 + 𝑲𝑗 ⋅ 𝜷𝐾 + 𝑺𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ⋅ 𝜷𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
for borough i, house type j, at time t.  𝑿𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of time specific control variables, 𝑾𝑖,𝑡−1 is a 
vector of lagged control variables, 𝒁𝑖 is a vector of time invariant control variables, 𝑲𝑗 is a vector 
of house type indicator variables, 𝑺𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is a vector of interaction variables between house type 
and total number of sales by type, and finally 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term. 
Model 2: No linear time trend 
log(𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) = (𝛽0 + 𝛿0,𝑖) + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡−1  
+𝛽2 ⋅ (𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡−1 x 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1) 
+𝛽3 ⋅ (𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡−1 x 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1) 
+𝑿𝑖,𝑡 ⋅ 𝜷𝑋 + 𝑾𝑖,𝑡−1 ⋅ 𝜷𝑊 + 𝒁𝑖 ⋅ 𝜷𝑍 + 𝑲𝑗 ⋅ 𝜷𝐾 + 𝑺𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ⋅ 𝜷𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
for borough i, house type j, at time t.  𝑿𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of time specific control variables, 𝑾𝑖,𝑡−1 is a 
vector of lagged control variables,  𝒁𝑖 is a vector of time invariant control variables, 𝑲𝑗 is a vector 
of house type indicator variables, 𝑺𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is a vector of interaction variables between house type and 
total number of sales by type, and finally 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term.  
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Model 3: Linear time trend included 
log(𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡) = (𝛽0 + 𝛿0,𝑖) + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡−1  
+𝛽2 ⋅ (𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡−1 x 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1) 
+𝛽3 ⋅ (𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡−1 x 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1) 
+𝛽4 ⋅ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑿𝑖,𝑡 ⋅ 𝜷𝑋 + 𝑾𝑖,𝑡−1 ⋅ 𝜷𝑊 + 𝒁𝑖 ⋅ 𝜷𝑍 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
for borough i at time t.  𝑿𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of time specific control variables, 𝑾𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector of lagged 
control variables, 𝒁𝑖 is a vector of time invariant control variables, and finally 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the 
idiosyncratic error term.  
 
Model 4: No linear time trend 
log(𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡) = (𝛽0 + 𝛿0,𝑖) + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡−1  
+𝛽2 ⋅ (𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡−1 x 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1) 
+𝛽3 ⋅ (𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡−1 x 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1) 
+𝑿𝑖,𝑡 ⋅ 𝜷𝑋 + 𝑾𝑖,𝑡−1 ⋅ 𝜷𝑊 + 𝒁𝑖 ⋅ 𝜷𝑍 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
for borough i at time t.  𝑿𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of time specific control variables, 𝑾𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector of lagged 
control variables, 𝒁𝑖 is a vector of time invariant control variables, and finally 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the 
idiosyncratic error term.  
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